Handbooks and local jurisdiction in Ming China. According to the sections on judicial matters in the «Shih-cheng lu» by Lü K'un, a handbook for magistrates

Dominiek Delporte 1
In imperial China, judicial matters fell under the authority of administrators at all levels of the civil and military administration. For most of these officials, their judicial function was only one of the many functions they had to exercise; they also were responsible for matters such as tax collection, public works, ceremonial observances, or the supervision of granaries. Few of them had enjoyed specialized judicial training, but they were nevertheless expected to have enough knowledge of the law and of judicial procedures to be able to perform their judicial duties 2 .
2
In order to improve the judicial knowledge and skills of these officials, and in order to help them to avoid malpractices, commentaries on the codes -originally only by government functionaries in their official capacity, but from the Yüan dynasty (1279-1368) on also by private individuals -and handbooks for magistrates were compiled. This form of literature was aimed at explaining the meaning of the statutes and at advising the officials on their application. Some of the handbooks are reprints of the code with interlinear commentary between the statutes and sub-statutes, others are case collections in which the decision in each case is motivated with stipulations from the code, precedents, or moral concepts. A third group of handbooks is formed by manuals that give practical advice for each procedure the civil officials were responsible for. Handbooks belonging to this last group also contain some excerpts from the code, and illustrate important steps in the procedures by means of specific cases.
During the time he held these provincial posts, he issued collections of written advice to his subordinates and colleagues, as introductions to the civil and judicial local administration 18 . He issued five different documents comprised of prescriptions: «Ming-chih» (prescriptions for provincial officials), «Hsiang-chia yüeh» (prescriptions for local sub-official personnel), «Feng-hsien yüeh» (advice for provincial surveillance officials and censors 19 ), «Yü-cheng» (prescriptions for officials in charge of prisons), and «Tu-fu yüeh» (advice for governors and governors-general). In 1598, these were printed together under the title «Lü-kung shih-cheng lu» («Record of practical government by Lord Lü»). His handbook was later abridged and adapted, and remained an important manual for provincial magistrates during the Ch'ing dynasty , under the title «Shih-cheng lu» («Record of practical government») 20 .
10 New handbooks also appeared during the Ch'ing. The most influential ones were the «Mu-ling shu» («Compendium on magisterial service», compiled in 1848 by Hsü Tung), the «Fu-hui ch'üan-shu» («Complete book on well-being and benevolence», edited in 1694 by Huang Liu-hung) and the «Hsüeh-chih i-shuo» («Views on learning governance», published by Wang Hui-tsu (1731-1807) in 1793). The «Mu-ling shu» was extremely important, since it was the most comprehensive handbook, bringing together selections from influential authors throughout the Ch'ing dynasty 21 .
2. The importance of Lü K'un's manual 11 Handbooks like the «Hsi yüan lu», the «Shih-cheng lu» and the Ch'ing handbooks give us an abundance of practical instructions for judicial procedures. Whereas the «Hsi yüan lu» and its descendants concentrate mainly on investigations in murder cases, the «Shih-cheng lu» lists dozens of prescriptions for each procedure -inquests, investigations, arrests, hearings, and sending of reports -and illustrates some of them with examples from actual cases. These prescriptions provide us with important information about the practical functioning of the judicial system. Instructions to the magistrates on how to avoid malpractice and abuse inevitably also point out the shortcomings of the Chinese judicial system. The authors of the handbooks had, without any doubt, personally experienced such malpractice during their career in the civil administration.
12 During the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), the handbooks were essential sources of information on law and judicial procedures, not only because many officials were insufficiently trained, but also because the Ming code, after its final revision in 1389 22 , was supposed to remain unchanged throughout the entire dynasty 23 , so that, as time moved on, the code was no longer in accordance with social reality, and officials started to experience problems in applying the existing code 24 . These problems were especially critical in cases of civil nature, the so-called «minor matters of households, marriages, and land» («hu, hun, t'ien-t'u hsi-shih») . These matters were not always sufficiently recognized by the code, since they were supposed to be dealt with on the informal level. Handbooks could give the officials practical instructions on how to deal with matters for which the code could not offer a solution.
13 Lü K'un's manual is less moralising and more pragmatic than many other handbooks. He was motivated less by purely moral principles than by the awareness that well-educated subordinates would ensure a correct and efficient functioning of the local government 3. The sections on judicial matters in the «Shih-cheng Lu», chapter «Feng-hsien Yüeh» 17 All quotations below -translated from the original classical Chinese text -are drawn from the chapter entitled «Feng-hsien yüeh», the exhortations for surveillance officials (the censors in the capital, the regional inspectors, and the provincial administration commissions), since they were the ones charged with revealing malpractice amongst the other officials, and with taking corrective and punitive measures to redress or prevent it. They had to conduct regular and irregular evaluations of local magistrates. The prescriptions and criticisms that Lü K'un directs at them give us, more than any other chapter in his work, an idea of the shortcomings of the judicial system, especially on the local level, and of the difficulties in applying the law at the end of the sixteenth century.
18 For each specific procedure that local officials had to deal with, the sections on «judicial matters» («t'i-hsing shih-yi») in the chapter «Feng-hsien yüeh» give specific guidelines on how to carry out that procedure and on how to avoid or solve problems that might arise when carrying it out. For conducting investigations in murder cases, the guidelines consist of 12 'articles' in total; for investigating theft and robbery, Lü K'un's advice is 11 articles long; the prescriptions for dealing with sexual offences consist of 4 articles; there are 10 articles on arrests and imprisonment; 12 on hearing trials; and 4 on the use of instruments of torture and punishment. This is followed by a series of models of official forms, used for formulating complaints and accusations.
19 The instructions were all directed towards officials responsible for supervising the functioning of local administrative levels. They stress primarily the initial stages in the trying of a case, and not, or to a much lesser extent, such matters as higher appeals or the granting of amnesties. The latter belonged to the activities of higher judicial organs on or above the provincial level. 29 By citing these anecdotes, Lü K'un tries to convince officials not to accept claims uncritically, since they were liable for punishment if they made a wrong judgment 40 . The effect of this situation was, not surprisingly, that officials were often reluctant to accept claims. Furthermore, investigating whether the plaint was true or not put such a heavy burden on officials that they immediately refused to accept certain plaints. Additionally, the officials in whose jurisdiction there was the lowest number of offences were regarded as the best officials; hence, many officials tried to disguise the fact that criminal acts occurred in their jurisdiction. If the facts could not be hidden, they had to solve the case by the end of the imposed deadline and, as a consequence, produce an offender. This often meant that officials or sub-official functionaries who could not find the culprit, intimidated innocent people and forced them to plead guilty. 31 It is obvious that in cases of rape and adultery as well, not all charges could be accepted 42 . Because the penalty for illicit sex with consent (beatings with a heavy bamboo staff) differed dramatically from the punishment for rape (death by strangulation), the responsibility of the officials who investigated and sentenced in these matters was extremely heavy, so that magistrates tended to shun this responsibility 43 .
32 Cases involving sexual offences were even harder to judge when they involved people who did not belong to the «morally educated» classes. The difference between the common people and the higher classes is, according 36 These «common practices of the sub-official functionaries» refer to bribery and to the arresting of innocent people in order to make them confess, abuses that could be avoided only by keeping important procedures out of the hands of clerks and runners.
37 Arrests were sometimes followed by a long period of imprisonment. The code of the Ming contains regulations that are meant to ensure a humane treatment of prisoners. Imprisonment was not a formally recognised sentence in itself; it was a measure taken to detain people who were awaiting trial (sometimes including the plaintiff and witnesses) or punishment. Nevertheless, many suspects spent many years in jail awaiting their trial or retrial, or their punishment. Contemporary descriptions 47 show that conditions in Ming prisons were extremely harsh. Jailers, who also belonged to the group of sub-official functionaries, frequently extorted money from prisoners and maltreated prisoners who 39 This section clearly reflects the author's extremely realistic, practical and systematic approach to such matters.It is obvious that the local government agencies did not have unlimited financial means. The government budget that local magistrates received to finance the administrative expenses of their local offices was far from adequate; they had to impose different kinds of customary fees in their jurisdiction. Furthermore these fees were not always sufficient, since the population did not have the financial reserves to pay high fees on top of the regular taxes. A local magistrate always had to find a way to raise enough money to meet the expenses of his administration, without extracting too much money from the people 52 . 44 A third point the author wishes to raise in this section is that not all plaints are reliable, and that litigation abuse is extremely common. This litigation abuse is seen as a crucial problem by most of the handbook writers 57 . False plaints, in order to extort money from the innocent accused, were often composed with the help from clerks working in local government agencies, who augmented their low salaries by collecting fees from litigants 58 , or with the help from the so-called «sung-shih», «litigation masters», people (often students or former clerks) who were specialised in drawing up charges, or false accusations, for any client who could afford their services. They were familiar with the loopholes of the legal and judicial system, and wasted the local magistrate's time with their constant sabotage in the form of plaints and counter-plaints 59 . If the magistrate did not prove his competence in front of these abusers -and in front of the whole audience of the open sessions in which the plaints were evaluated -by firmly refusing to accept their plaints, these «litigation masters» would not hesitate to exploit this weakness, even though they risked severe punishment 60 . One of the articles in the Ming code that was meant to prevent false accusations from being presented stipulated that anyone entering an anonymous accusation would receive the death penalty. Plaintiffs had to present their accusations in person, not through a third party 61 .
45 In addition to the heavy responsibility of local officials (sentencing an innocent person, or sentencing somebody for the wrong crime, would result in a penalty for the magistrate himself), this litigation abuse, which burdened the local administrational units with endless useless work, was one of the main reasons why many plaints should not be accepted. 46 This brings us again to the conclusion that magistrates should not accept plaints indiscriminatingly, especially not those about minor matters, in order to prevent the caseload of local administrational units from becoming overwhelming. If the number of penal matters in a local magistrate's jurisdiction was too high, he risked being found incompetent in his superiors' evaluations, since, according to the traditional Confucianist view on government and law, the task of a good government functionary was, in the first place, to prevent injustice from happening, rather than restoring what had gone wrong. 48 Although Lü K'un favours a humane treatment of suspects and prisoners, he nevertheless allows the use of some «extra-legal» torture instruments, but only within certain limits. Here, two of Lü K'un's most important ideals seem to be in conflict: his concern for a humane treatment of suspects and convicts on one hand, and his fanatical belief in an efficient legal system, which included speeding up the judicial procedures, and especially the obtaining of confessions, on the other. In an attempt to find a compromise between these two principles, he limits the use of illegal torture as follows: 50 Illegal torture 69 was common practice, since a confession was deemed to be the only way to settle a case satisfactorily. Although officials could be punished if they tortured somebody (the suspects, but also the witnesses) illegally, the frequent complaints about these practices prove that the pressure of having to find a culprit who confessed weighed heavier for the magistrates than their fear of being punished for maltreatment of suspects.
f. Models of the forms for reporting crimes 51 To report criminal facts to the authorities, a form needed to be filled out. The author gives in his handbook models of 27 different forms. Where blanks must be filled in, Lü offers the possibility of multiple choice, or he explains what kind of information needs to be given there. The uniformity of these forms would rule out misunderstandings, and serve his ideal of a smoothly working civil and judicial bureaucracy. If somebody wanted to enter an accusation, but did not use the required formulation, the plaint could not be accepted. In his handbook, Lü K'un explains the necessity of these standard forms.
He determines that «what is now fixed as a model needs to be observed uniformly by all bureaus. If
Handbooks and local jurisdiction in Ming China. According to the sections on . 54 Below, we have translated two of the models presented by Lü K'un. We have chosen forms that are used for matters of civil nature: a form for reporting financial debts, and a form for reporting disputes over so-called «household divisions».
«Model of a form for reporting financial debts:
'In district (x), belonging to sub-prefecture (x) in prefecture (x), person (x) has incurred debts. Because person (x) was short of capital, somebody lent (x ounces of silver or x piculs of grain) to person (x) on the (x)th day of the (x)th month of the year (x), and he added an interest of three percent a month 73 . He designated somebody to be the mediator, and [he made] a receipt for the borrowed money. Now, person (x)has, during several years, up to this day, not returned the least bit of the interest, or he has only returned (a certain amount) of the interest, and he still owes (a certain amount).Repeatedly, he has asked for a delay of payment, [but] no agreement was reached, [so now] it is reported to the authorities' 74 .
57 Disputes over debts were usually resolved through a middleman, so that lawsuits over unpaid debts were not very numerous. The lender could turn to this mediator for help if the borrower did not repay; if this mediator also acted as a guarantor, he was supposed to pay in the case of non-payment by the borrower. For large amounts, the lender usually required pledged security 75 .
«Model of a form for reporting [arguments over] property:
'Person (x) from district (x), belonging to sub-prefecture (x) in prefecture (x), is involved in a dispute concerning property. For a certain reason 76 , a certain (ancestor x) left [to his sons or grandsons], (a number of houses, or x acres of land, or a capital consisting of x ounces of silver, or a number of women's ornaments or garments). Person (x)had to share it equally with certain (uncles or elder brothers), according to the family relationships. Now, person (x), taking advantage of the fact that he is a senior [relative], completely intimidates [the other relatives] and takes it all, and does not share it. Referring to the will, or to the testimony of a certain (relative or neighbour), it is reported'» 77 .
60 The procedure for this kind of household division (with an equal partition -usually between brothers -of land, houses, or furniture) was complex and easily led to conflicts. These divisions of family property involved mediators, who witnessed the division in order to avoid possible disputes in the future, so that lawsuits over household division were comparatively rare 78 .
mentioned «minor cases of households, marriages and land»). The law expected magistrates to deal with penal matters, whereas civil matters (unless they involved criminal acts) had to be dealt with by informal justice, with middlemen (in conflicts over contractual matters) or community leaders acting as mediators trying to find a compromise. In most cases, the parties involved in a conflict turned to the official judicial organs only if no agreement could be reached through this informal justice system. If somebody did take his civil case to the local magistrates to reach a settlement, he had to convince the -often reluctant -magistrate to accept his plaint or petition. The primary condition for this was to use the standardized form to present the plaint.
Conclusion
62 Why, could one ask, does Lü K'un still warn officials against the corrupt behaviour of clerks and runners, against fraud by culprits and victims, and against their own shortsightedness, 350 years after Sung Tz'u had done the same, and even longer after Kuei Wan-jung had published his case book? Should the task of civil administrators not have become easier, since their number had increased 79 ? Why did Lü K'un feel the need to write this new manual for magistrates?
63 It is impossible to state that the previous handbooks had become obsolete; many later versions of the handbooks from earlier dynasties were published during the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties 80 . Those later versions incorporated new elements, so that they kept in tune with recent developments.
64 To understand why Lü K'un compiled this new work, we need to be aware of the fact that he was an idealist, who was convinced that he had to do all that was in his power to promote social harmony and justice. When assuming his provincial posts, he wanted optimal co-operation from his subordinates, and he required that they be totally familiar with judicial procedures, in order to serve the public interest. Therefore, he wrote out these instructions. He carried his fanatical belief in order and perfection so far that he even started criticizing the emperor for his shortcomings, in his famous memorial of 1597. As a result, Lü was accused of dereliction of duty and dismissed 81 .
65 Another important factor is the fact that, although the number of officials had risen, their expertise and experience in many fields, including the legal field, often proved insufficient. Officials easily shifted from one function to another during their career, without having the chance to specialize in any one field. Furthermore, in most cases, the civil-service examinations did not test the candidates' legal and judicial knowledge 82 . The magistrates had to rely on the specialized knowledge of sub-official functionaries, such as clerks and technical aids, whose total number probably exceeded 100,000 during the Ming. Lü K'un felt the need to give the officials under his authority specific advice in order to improve their expertise, including in «minor cases of households, marriages and land», which were still too often overlooked by the central government and for which the stipulations in the official code proved insufficient.
66 Besides the lack of expertise, there were other important problems that threatened the smooth functioning of local government agencies, such as the heavy responsibilities of local magistrates in penal matters, the numerous abuses, and the overwork and financial limitations of the local administrative units. The heavy responsibilities consisted of the magistrate's liability for punishment if he made a wrong judgment, and of the fact that he had to keep the number of legal cases in his jurisdiction low enough to receive a favourable evaluation from his superiors; at the same time, he had to conclude the cases he dealt with in a satisfactory manner by finding an offender who would confess. This had to happen within the prescribed time limit, otherwise it could lead to his punishment and impeachment. Abuses, by their own staff (corruption, extortion, abuse of power) or by outsiders (drawing up and entering of false accusations), put a heavy burden on the local magistrates. Even the heavy penalties they risked did not deter abusers. Furthermore, as their caseload increased, local officials saw a great deal of their time consumed by often useless investigations -and they could not afford to waste any time, since there were always deadlines to be taken into account. In addition, some local government bureaus did not have the financial means to guarantee correct functioning and fair treatment of victims and suspects.
67 A major source of conflicts of interests, which formed the basis of many problems in local units of judicial administration, were the different motivations of officials and sub-official functionaries. The former wanted to keep the number of cases in their jurisdiction as low as possible, out of fear of a negative evaluation and because they simply did not have the time to deal with a great number of cases, whereas the latter wished to help anybody, reliable or not, to enter accusations, since their income directly depended on the number of cases for which they helped to draw up documents or for which one of the parties bribed them.
68 An important question that remains unanswered is: do Lü K'un's guidelines make the task of officials easier in the end and do they help them save time and avoid abuses? One of the most frequently recurring pieces of advice to the local magistrates in the «Shih-cheng lu» is that they should not accept plaints lightly. Refusing obviously ungrounded plaints was the best way to avoid some of the most frequent abuses, and to save time and money. This way, if the number of cases could be reduced by refusing to accept unreliable accusations, officials would have enough time to deal with important procedures themselves, so that runners and clerks would not be given the opportunity to abuse their authority. However, it seems to us that even if officials refused to accept all «unreasonable» accusations, dealing with all important judicial procedures personally would probably consume as much time as they wasted on dealing with false and ungrounded charges.
69 A second basic guideline that features prominently in Lü K'un's manual is that local officials should not confine themselves to the letter of the law. They should also use their own common sense and experience in investigating and judging, for instance when judging cases of «illicit sex» among the lower classes of the population. This «consideration» he expects from local officials consumes more time and energy than a simple, «blind» application of the law would do.
70 As these examples show, there are often conflicts between Lü K'un's ideals and principles, especially between the ideal of ensuring a humane treatment of suspects and convicts, and the ideal of efficiency and saving time (which would allow the official to handle more matters personally, and to prevent abuses). These ideals are often difficult to unite for Lü K'un, who is constantly trying to find a compromise and a reasonable balance between them.
71 One of the most striking manifestations of this conflict between principles can be found in Lü K'un's advice on illegal torture: inspired by his ideal of humaneness, he does not approve of it, and he even wants to convince officials to avoid, as much as possible, any
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Crime, Histoire &amp; Sociétés / Crime, History &amp; Societies, Vol. 6, n°2 | 2009 form of torture, whereas, pushed by his ideal of efficiency and saving time, he acknowledges that some forms of -legal and illegal -torture can be used, under certain restrictions, when a suspect who is clearly guilty refuses to confess.
72 His whole handbook is full of attempts to find such compromises. Lü K'un had a sharp and accurate view on some of the most acute judicial problems in his time. His solutions were realistic, but they often consisted of compromises that were probably not always easy to maintain in reality. The fact that his handbook remained important during the Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1911) proves, however, that officials who had real experience of the problems addressed by Lü K'un accepted his solutions as realistic.
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11.
The system of recruitment through examinations was the most important system for recruiting civil officials during the Ming. The first phase of these examinations, which were conducted every three years, were the provincial examinations, in each provincial capital, in Peiching, and in Nan-ching. Those who passed these provincial examinations could sit the metropolitan examination in the capital. This was followed by a palace examination, where those who had passed the metropolitan examination were divided by rank into three groups.
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ABSTRACTS
In addition to their judicial functions, local magistrates in imperial China had to perform many other tasks, without specializing in any one field. In order to ensure that these officials would have the necessary expertise, handbooks were compiled.
The «Shih-cheng lu» («Record of practical government»), a manual edited in 1589, contains sections that offer an extremely realistic insight into the functioning, difficulties and shortcomings of local judicial administration during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). These sections -guidelines for surveillance officials -point out the many problems that surrounded local magistrates in Ming China: the constant threat of unfavorable evaluations, the continuous pressure of investigation deadlines, a large caseload, underpaid staff who did not hesitate to abuse their authority, and liability for punishment if they made wrong judgments. Lü K'un, the 
